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THE GENERAL POWER OF
APPOINTMENT AS AN INTEREST
IN PROPERTY
Lawrence Berger*
I. INTRODUCTION
The commentators in the field of future interests have, for the
most part, agreed there is a trend in the law toward piercing the
fictional veil that a general power is a mere mandate or authority to
dispose of property.' They see the current of judicial opinion and
statutory enactment as flowing toward a recognition that the gen-
eral power, involving as it does the right to appoint to oneself or
*B.S. in Econ., 1949, University of Pennsylvania, LL.B., 1952, Rutgers Uni-
versity. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1 "What one sees in the cases . . . is the conflict between the agency ap-
proach justified by the historical origin of powers of appointment and
the demand of modern reality that the law recognize the donee of a power
as having a property interest in the appointive assets, whenever the find-
ing of such an interest leads to the presently desirable result. This con-
flict marks an important potential growing point in the law." 3 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY § 387 (1952) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
"No branch of the law of property has been more adaptable to the
uses of legal legerdemain than the law of powers. By logical deductions
from patent fictions it has been possible to produce results somewhat
resembling those claimed for black magic. To the uninitiated it would
appear that a general power of appointment is substantially the equiv-
alent of ownership, and that to exercise a power is in effect to make a
conveyance. But the theory of the common law was that the only act of
transfer is that of the donor, and that the donee, when he exercises the
power, merely causes an event to occur on which ownership shifts from
one person to another just as it shifts by the operation of the shifting use.
Looked at broadly, it would seem that the major trend in the law of
powers is one toward a recognition of the power as ownership rather than
as a mere mandate. By that statement, it must not be inferred that a
power is ownership; but only that the tendency is to treat the donee as
if he were owner in a larger number of situations than fifty years ago."
Simes, Fifty Years of Future Interests, 50 HARV. L. REV. 749, 772 (1937).
See also 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 150 (1926)
and SUGDEN, POWERS 396 (8th ed. 1861).
Indeed, Dean Griswold has suggested that even the special power
be treated as property for estate tax purposes. Griswold, Powers of Ap-
pointment and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARV. L. REV. 929, 955-60
(1939). But Professor Leach took sharp exception to this thesis. Leach,
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one's estate,2 is for many purposes an interest in property. They
add that the law must recognize this in dealing with the manifold
problems of substantive law as they relate to the interest of the
donee of the power.
Since the donee of a general power can appoint to himself, if
the power is presently exercisable, or at least to his estate, if the
power is testamentary only, it may indeed be questioned whether
for all purposes the general power should not be treated as an
interest in property. If the general power is but an historical relic
which has outlived its usefulness except to evade rules of law re-
lating to the liabilities and duties of ownership, 3 and if the legiti-
mate objects of the donor of a power can be accomplished by other
means without the accompanying evasion of these liabilities and
duties, perhaps there is no need at all for the general power. 4 On
the other hand, if these legitimate objects cannot be effectuated
by any other device, perhaps the approach should be to retain the
general power but to change some of the legal effects of its creation.5
Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax-A Dissent, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 964 et seq. (1939).
2 "A power is general .. , if (a) being exercisable before the death of the
donee, it can be exercised wholly in favor of the donee, or, (b) being
testamentary, it can be exercised wholly in favor of the estate of the
donee." RESTATEMENT, Property § 320 (1) (1940).
For a detailed discussion of the distinctions between general and
special powers and the no-man's land in between see Gold, The Classifi-
cation of Some Powers of Appointment, 40 MICH. L. REV. 337 (1942) and
SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 875 (2d ed. 1956) [here-
inafter cited as SIMES & SMITH].
3 This criticism was probably first leveled by the Revisers of the New York
Statutes of 1828. "The law of powers . . . is probably the most intricate
labyrinth in all our jurisprudence .... In plain language, it abounds
pre-eminently in useless distinctions difficult to be understood and diffi-
cult to be applied .... It is liable to still more serious objections, since
as will appear in the course of our remarks, it affords the ready means
of evading the most salutary provisions of our statutes." 3 N.Y. REV.
STAT., Revisers' Notes, 588 (2d ed. 1836).
4 This is also suggested by the Revisers of the New York Statutes of 1828.
In speaking of the general and beneficial power they said: "It appears
to us, that in this country, it can hardly happen that such a power of
disposition will be separated from the legal estate for any purpose the
law ought to favor." 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. Revisers' Notes 589-90 (2d ed.
1836).
5 This view is suggested by Professor McDougal. "Could not the dogma
[that a power is not property] and its nonpreferred consequences be ban-
ished but the 'device' [of the power of appointment] preserved for the
sake of 'flexibility' only?" McDougal, Future Interests Restated, 55
HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1114 (1942).
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The purpose of this article is to explore, in summary, the his-
torical basis for the general power and the reasons for the current
prevalence of its use. The question of whether the general power
does have peculiar characteristics and advantages in intent effectua-
tion will be evaluated in more detail. In addition, the law as it re-
lates to the rights of third parties claiming through or against the
donee of the power (creditors, spouse, and heirs) will be critically
examined with a view to determining to what extent the donee's
power is and should be treated as a property interest.6 Suggestions
as to recommended changes in the law will be advanced. Such
changes of necessity would have to be by statute because of the
properly strong judicial predisposition toward the doctrine of
stare decisis in the property area. In traversing all these problems,
the distinctions between a testamentary power and a power
presently exercisable7 as well as between powers simply collateral,
in gross, and appendant8 are of some convenience and should be
kept in mind.
6Decisions in other areas of the law of powers also depend upon whether
the courts view the power as a mandate or as property. These would in-
clude, inter alia, estate and gift taxation of the donee's interest, delega-
tion of powers, the rule against perpetuities, the capacity of the donee,
allocation or marshalling problems, the effect of an ineffectual attempt
to exercise the general power, and release of powers. The rights of third
parties are analyzed in detail because these rights are perhaps the most
directly dependent upon the resolution of the nature of the power.
7 "(1) A testamentary power, . . . is a power exercisable only by will.
"(2) A power presently exercisable, .. . is a power as to which the
donor has not manifested an intent that its exercise shall be postponed."
RESTATEMENT, Property § 321 (1940). The essence of the power pres-
ently exercisable is, of course, that the donee may exercise the power
inter vivos. See SIMES & SMITH § 874.
8 "Where the donee of a power of appointment has no other interest in the
thing with respect to which the power exists the power is said to be col-
lateral .... Thus if A conveys Blackacre to B for life remainder to such
persons as C shall appoint, C, having no interest in Blackacre, other than
the power is said to have a collateral power. On the other hand, if the
donee has an interest in addition to the power, which interest will not be
affected by an exercise of the power, the power is said to be 'in gross'. If
A conveys to B for life remainder to such persons as B shall appoint,
B's power, by reason of his life estate, is a power in gross .... A power
was said to be 'appendant' or 'appurtenant' when an exercise of it divested
an interest owned by the donee of the power. Thus, if A should transfer
Blackacre to such persons as B shall appoint and until and in default of
appointment to B and his heirs, B, if the classification is accepted, has a
power appendant." 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.12 (Casner
ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY].
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II. EARLY HISTORY 9
It will be recalled that before the Statutes of Uses and Wills
there were a few places in England where land was devisable at
the common law according to local custom.10 In those cases the law
allowed the devisor to give his executor a power to sell the lands
though the executor had no interest in the land at all." This was
apparently the beginning of the concept in the law that a person
who had no property interest in land could cause the estate to
move from one person to another.
The power of appointment itself was developed in Chancery
through the vehicle of the use.12 It was utilized chiefly in those
places where land was not devisable to make it in effect devisable.
In such case, the owner in fee would convey to a feoffee to the use
of such persons as the feoffor should appoint by will, and in default
of and until the appointment to the use of the feoffor. If the feoffor
died testate, equity compelled the feoffee to convey to the devisee.
13
Even after the Statute of Wills in 1540, powers of appointment were
used for a similar purpose, for under that statute only two-thirds of
the land held in knight service could be devised. 14 It was decided
in Clere's case' 5 that this inhibition of the statute8 could also be
evaded by use of the power. Thus, the first type of power recognized
by the law, was a general power, a device developed chiefly to
evade rules of law which have been off the books for literally
hundreds of years.
17
9 For a more detailed treatment see SIMES & SMITH § 872 and 5 AMER-
ICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.2.
10 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 136, 137 (1926).
1 Anonymous Y.B., 9 Hy. VI, Trin. pl. 19 (1430); 7 HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. supra note 10 at 153; LITTLETON, TENURES § 169.
12 Basset's Case, 2 Dyer 136a, 73 Eng. Rep. 297 (1557); 4 HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 474 (1926).
13 SIMES & SMITH § 872.
14 32 Henry VIII, c. 1 (1540).
15 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599).
16 This inhibition continued until 1660 when knight tenure was changed to
socage tenure, 12 Car. II c. 24. Land held in socage tenure was fully de-
visable under the Statute of Wills.
17 The special power developed somewhat later. The first case on the sub-
ject was decided in 1625. Daniel v. Ubley, W. Jones 137, 82 Eng. Rep. 73.
Cases in the latter part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fi-
nally established the special power as a separate concept. Liefe v. Salt-
ingstone, 1 Mod. 189, 86 Eng. Rep. 819 (1674); Thomlinson v. Dighton,
1 Salk. 239, 91 Eng. Rep. 212 (1795); 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 168-71 (1926).
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Later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England,
the general power was used by conveyancers to give flexibility to
the land law system and also to skirt other inconvenient rules of
law, particularly those involving dower and curtesy, 8 and the in-
capacity of married women to convey.19
These evasions were made possible by the development of the
doctrine of "relation back," the main strut in the ancient super-
structure of powers. This doctrine was expressed in two forms:
(1) that the appointee of the property takes directly from the donor
of the power; or (2) that the instrument exercising the power is
to be read as part of the instrument creating the power. 20 The ex-
ercise of the power of appointment was viewed as a shifting event
much as any other shifting executory interest was viewed. The
taker in default was said to have a vested remainder subject to
complete defeasance. 21 The appointee would take by way of shift-
ing use, although he would not have an executory interest before
the appointment was made.22 Thus, according to classical theory,
if A left Blackacre to B for life, remainder as B appoints by will and
in default of appointment to C and his heirs, C would have a vested
remainder subject to complete defeasance, though the likelihood
is that C will never have enjoyment of Blackacre.
The doctrine of relation back, minimizing as it does the im-
portance of the donee of the power, is the hoary theoretical main-
stay for those rules of law which treat the donee as a mere
agent with no property interest.2 3 Indeed, it is still a much pro-
18 It was held that where a man had a fee simple with an appendant power
of appointment, the exercise of the power defeated the wife's claim of
dower in the fee. Ray v. Pung, 5 Madd. 310, 56 Eng. Rep. 914 (1821) and
5 B. & Ald. 561, 106 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1822).
19 It was early held that a married woman could exercise a power of ap-
pointment though she could not convey property not subject to a power
without her husband's joining. See 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 181 (1926).
20 SIMES & SMITH § 911. For an excellent general discussion of the entire
problem of relation back, see SIMES & SMITH §§ 911-20.
21 RESTATEMENT, Property § 157 c, illustration 3 (1936).
22 RESTATEMENT, Property § 25, comment d (1936).
23 The RESTATEMENT discusses this in the following paragraph:
"Many of the characteristic rules of the law of powers are accounted
for by the conception of a power as a mere authority and its doctrinal
corollary of 'relation back'-for example, the rule that married women
can exercise a power over types of property which they have no capacity
to convey . . ., the rule that the period of perpetuities is computed from
the creation of the power with reference to appointments under special
powers and general testamentary powers . . ., the rule that the spouse
GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT
claimed principle in handling problems of powers, 24 although it
has been widely attacked as of little value in solving specific prob-
lems.2 5
III. LATER HISTORY
The frequency of the use of powers has ebbed and flowed in
English history.26 In the United States there was very little use
of the power of appointment, general or special, before 1900.27 The
increase in its utilization since that time is accounted for by the
recognition of these advantages: 28 (1) it enables the decision as to
who shall be the final taker of property to be postponed, thus giv-
ing additional flexibility to property settlements in meeting later
changed conditions; (2) it (more especially the special power) pro-
vides a convenient vehicle for tax avoidance; 29 (3) it serves as a
means to block the operation of those rules of law which impose
burdens upon the owner of property, especially in relation to the
creditor's and spouse's rights.30
Today, the power of appointment is a widely used device in the
estate planner's portfolio. It should be noted, however, that it is
judicious use of the special power which best effectuates the ob-
of the donee has no dower in the property. RESTATEMENT, Prop-
erty c. 25, introductory note (1940).
24 For the latest case to use the language of relation back see In re Von Der
Hallen's Trust, 169 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
25"[T]he tendency to apply the 'relation back' doctrine woodenly to all
situations frequently has led the law to disregard the essential nature of
a general power." 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.3. See also
SIMES & SMITH § 920.
26 "Periods of large importance and of comparative disuse have followed
one another. They began in a blaze of importance in the latter half of
the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries; they slumped
into comparative desuetude during the seventeenth century; they revived
as major stars in the legal firmament while family settlements in Eng-
land were being evolved, particularly in the eighteenth century; they
were of negligible importance in the United States down to 1900 and now
they are again on the upswing into a role which is likely to be of great
importance." Powell, Powers of Appointment, 10 BROOKLYN L. REV.
233 (1941).
27 Ibid.
28 See Leach, Powers of Appointment, 24 A.B.A.J. 807, 808 (1938), and 7
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 192 (1926) for a dis-
cussion of the uses of powers.
29 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2041. See Craven, Powers of Appointment
Act of 1951, 65 HARV. L. REV. 55 (1951).
30 See text accompanying notes 35 et seq. and 42 et seq.
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jects of the intelligent estate planner because of the aforementioned
tendency of the law to identify the general power with property
interests.3 1
IV. RIGHTS OF CREDITORS, SPOUSE AND HEIRS OF DONEE
As was noted above,3 2 depending upon for what purposes they
are evaluating the interest, the courts and legislatures have empha-
sized either the agency aspect or the diametrically opposed proprie-
tary aspect of the general power. In studying the rights of third
parties claiming against or through the donee of the power, the
interplay between these two concepts is very evident.
Two main lines of authority concerning third party rights have
formed. The common law system evolved first. In protest of and
in conflict with many of the common law rules, the New York
statutory system of powers was enacted in 1830.3 3 Many states have
copied New York's system.3 4 As a background for our discussion,
a short summary of the common law and New York rules is set
out for the reader's convenience.
A. COMMON LAW SYSTEM-CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Where the general power is unexercised, the creditors of the
donee generally may not reach the appointive property.3 5 This
rule has two exceptions. If the donee of the power is also the donor
and the original conveyance is fraudulent as to creditors at the
time it was made, creditors may come in.3 6 Also, if the settlor of
81 Of course the most compelling reason for the draftsman to use the spe-
cial power is that the Federal Estate Tax, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2041, in effect, treats the donee of a general power as owner for tax pur-
poses. Thus, the tax is imposed on the estate of the donor when the power
is created by will, and on the estate of the donee when the power is exer-
cised by will. In the case of the special testamentary power, the exercise
of the power is not taxed. See Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of
1951, 65 HARV. L. REV. 55 (1951).
32 See note 1 supra.
33 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 130 to 183.
34 MICH. STAT. ANN. (1959) §§ 26.91-.152; N.D. REV. CODE (1943) §§ 59-
0501-59; 60 OKLA. S.A. (1941) §§ 181-299; S.D. CODE (1939) §§ 59.0401-
61; WIS. STAT. ANN. (1957) §§ 232.01-.58; D.C. CODE (1951) §§ 45-
1001-19.
35 Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 (1881); Bentham v. Smith, 15 S.C. Eq. 33, 34
Am. Dec. 599 (1840); Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., 58 Tex. Civ.
App. 186, 123 S.W. 1162 (1909); RESTATEMENT, Property § 327 (1940).
6 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACT §§ 4 and 7. See SIMES
& SMITH § 944 n. 22 and cases therein cited.
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a trust reserves a life estate and a general testamentary power over
the corpus, the courts allow the creditors of the settlor-donee to
obtain satisfaction out of the property, whether the power is ex-
ercised or not, on the ground that he retained substantial ownership
of the property.3 7
Where the power is exercised by will, the courts have generally
allowed the creditors of the donee to levy upon the property if
his personal estate is not sufficient to pay the debts.38 In the case
of the inter vivos exercise of a power presently exercisable, author-
ity is sparse, but the little there is asserts that the creditors of the
donee may reach the property to the extent that they could set a
conveyance aside under the rules relating to fraudulent conveyances
had the property been owned by the donee at the time of the con-
veyance.39 In general, then, the common law holds that exercised
general powers are subject to the rights of the donee's creditors
but unexercised powers are not. A really satisfactory explanation
for the rationale of the distinction has yet to be given.40 The Federal
Bankruptcy Act completely ignores such distinctions with respect
to the general power presently exercisable. Such powers, whether
exercised or not, pass to the trustee in bankruptcy for distribution
to the donee's creditors. 41
B. COMMON LAW SYSTEM-SPOUSE'S AND HEIRS' RIGHTS
It is universally accepted that the rights of dower and curtesy
do not attach to the interest of the donee of a general power
37Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 67 Atl. 52, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 369 (1907); see
3 POWELL § 389 n. 91 and cases therein cited; RESTATEMENT, Property
§ 328 (1948 Supp.).
38 Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879); Seward v. Kaufman, 119 N.J.
Eq. 44, 180 Atl. 857 (Ch. 1935). See also SIMES & SMITH § 945 n. 30 and
cases therein cited.
39 Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sr. 1, 28 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1750); RE-
STATEMENT, Property § 330 (1940). See also 5 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 23.16 and SIMES & SMITH § 945.
40 Professor Simes says this is a unique remedy for a unique situation.
SIMES & SMITH § 945. This is true, but is this a really satisfactory ex-
planation of the holding? See also 3 POWELL § 389 nn. 96-99.
41 "The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ... shall ... be vested by opera-
tion of law with the title of the bankrupt . . . to all of the following
-kinds of property . .. (3) powers which he might have exercised for his
own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised solely for
some other person ... ." 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958). The courts have held
that a testamentary power does not pass under this provision. Forbes
v. Snow, 245 Mass. 85, 140 N.E. 418 (1923).
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whether the power is exercised or not.42 This rule follows, of
course, from the common law requirement that the spouse to whose
property these rights attach, must have seisin of an estate of in-
heritance during coverture.
48
In those states which have statutorily replaced dower and
curtesy with a right in the spouse to renounce the will and take
a specified share of the estate, the courts have reached the same re-
sult.44 In such case, the problem obviously is one of the statutory
interpretation, the statutes generally providing for a share out of
the "property" or "estate" of the deceased at his death.45
The heirs of the donee of an unexercised general power have
no rights in the appointive property. The property reverts to the
donor or his estate unless there is an express provision in default
of appointment in the original gift.46 The power itself is personal
and does not pass to the heirs.
47
C. NEW YORK SYSTEM-CREDITORS' RIGHTS
The New York statutory system enacted in 183048 is the result
of the Revisers' strong opposition to the "intricate labyrinth" of the
common law system of powers.49 The Revisers recommended a
statute which in almost all respects is still the law today. The
statute included within its ambit powers of sale as well as powers
of appointment. 50 It contains many important departures in defini-
42 RESTATEMENT, Property § 332; SIMES & SMITH § 947; 3 POWELL
§ 391; 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.21.
43 CO. LITT. 29a.; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.6, 5.10.
44. Fiske v. Fiske, 173 Mass. 413, 53 N.E. 916 (1899); In re Kates Estate, 282
Pa. 417, 128 Atl. 97 (1925), and see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 23.22.
45 For collection, see 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 351 et seq.
(1935).
46Wintuska v. Peart, 237 Ky. 666, 36 S.W.2d 50 (1931); Brown v. Fidelity
Union Trust Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 406, 9 A.2d 311 (Ch. 1939); Cook v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 634, 158 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1956);
RESTATEMENT, Property § 367 (1940).
47 SIMES & SMITH § 943 and cases therein cited.
48 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 130 to 183.
49 See note 3 supra.
50 "Powers, as they existed by law on the thirty-first day of December,
eighteen hundred and twenty-nine are abolished. Hereafter the creation,
construction and execution of powers, affecting real property, shall be
subject to the provisions of this article; but this article does not extend
to a simple power of attorney to convey real property in the name and for
the benefit of the owner." N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 130.
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tion and in substantive result in the field of powers of appointment.
In the first place, the classification of powers as collateral, in gross
or appendant, is abandoned as meaningless. 51 The general power is
redefined as one in which a fee simple may be appointed to any
taker.52 A power is defined as special where there is a designation
of the person or class of persons to whom the property may be ap-
pointed or where the interest to be appointed is less than a fee.53
The statute then creates a new classification of powers based
upon the determination of whether any person other than the
grantee (donee) has an interest in its execution. If no person does,
then the power is "beneficial".54 If, however, the object of the
power is a person or class of persons other than the donee, or such
person or class is entitled to the proceeds of the exercise of the
power, the power is said to be "in trust".55
51 The Revisers were quite vehement in their opposition to the terminology
as can be gathered from the following quotation:
"These cabalistic terms, we are aware, must sound like an unknown
tongue to unpracticed ears; but our objection is not to the strange phrase-
ology in which this division is expressed but to the principle on which
it is founded....
"It is a striking error in this classification, that it overlooks entirely
the nature and objects of the power itself, and regards solely the con-
nexion between the party exercising the power, and the lands which it
embraces." 3 N.Y. REV. STAT., Revisor's Notes 588 (2d ed. 1836).
52 "A power is general, where it authorizes the transfer or incumbrance of
a fee, by either a conveyance or a will of, or a charge on, the property
embraced in the power, to any grantee whatever." N.Y. REAL PROP-
ERTY LAW § 134.
53 "A power is special where either:
"1. The persons or class of persons to whom the disposition of the
property under the power is to be made are designated; or
"2. The power authorizes the transfer or incumbrance, by a convey-
ance, will or charge, of any estate less than a fee." N.Y. REAL PROP-
ERTY LAW § 135.
54 "A general or special power is beneficial, where no person, other than
the grantee has, by the term of its creation, any interest in its execution.
A beneficial power, general or special, other than one of those specified
and defined in this article, is void." N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 136.
5.5 "A general power is in trust, where any person or class of persons, other
than the grantee of the power, is designated as entitled to the proceeds,
or any portion of the proceeds, or other benefits to result from its exe-
cution." N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 137.
"A special power is in trust where either,
"1. The disposition or charge which it authorizes is limited to be
made to a person or class of persons, other than the grantee of the power;
or
"2. A person or class of persons, other than the grantee, is designated
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The most important change wrought by the statutory system
concerns those instances where the donee of a power is deemed to
have a fee.56 The net effect of the statute is that creditors of the
donee can reach the appointive property whether the power is exer-
cised or not if the donee can in his own lifetime dispose of the fee
for his own benefit.57 If the donee is also a life tenant, then the
creditors can attach the fee even if the power is testamentary only,
as long as it is general and beneficial. 8  Under these rules the
creditors, purchasers or incumbrancers can come in and cut off the
rights of the takers in default of appointment.59 The statutory sys-
tem was almost completely emasculated in the case of Cutting v.
Cutting0 which held that creditors cannot come in if the donee has
as entitled to any benefit, from the disposition or charge authorized by
the power." N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 138.
56 The text of the relevant sections of the N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW is
as follows:
"§ 149. When estate for life or years is changed into a fee.
"Where an absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by a trust,
is given to the owner of a particular estate for life or for years, such
estate is changed into a fee absolute in respect to the rights of creditors,
purchasers and incumbrancers, but subject to any future estates limited
thereon, in case the power of absolute disposition is not executed, and
the property is not sold for the satisfaction of debts.
"§ 150. Certain powers create a fee.
"Where a like power of disposition is given to a person to whom no
particular estate is limited, such person also takes a fee, subject to any
future estates that may be limited thereon, but absolute in respect to
creditors, purchasers and incumbrancers.
"§ 151. When grantee of power has absolute fee.
"Where such a power of disposition is given, and no remainder is
limited on the estate of the grantee of the power, such grantee is entitled
to an absolute fee.
"§ 152. Effect of power to devise in certain cases.
"Where a general and beneficial power to devise the inheritance is
given to a tenant for life, or for years, such tenant is deemed to possess
an absolute power of disposition within the meaning of and subject to
the provisions of the last three sections.
"§ 153. When power of disposition is absolute.
"Every power of disposition by means of which the grantee is en-
abled, in his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own benefit, is
deemed absolute."
57 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 149, 150, 153. See Whiteside & Edelstein,
Life Estate with Power to Consume, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 447, 462 and cases
therein cited.
58 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 149, 152; In re Davies' Estate, 242 N.Y.
196, 151 N.E. 205 (1926).
59 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 150.
60 86 N.Y. 522 (1881). The court said that the donee does not have an abso-
lute power of disposition because of the outstanding legal interest of the
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merely an equitable estate. In such case, the creditors are in a
worse position than at common law, because the court held they
cannot reach the property even if the power is exercised. The rea-
son given is that the statutory system supersedes the common law
rights of creditors. Of course, where the power of appointment de-
vice is used, the trust situation is by far the most common and this
holding thus defeats the rights of creditors in New York in the
great majority of cases.
D. NEW YORK SYSTEM-SPOUSE'S AND HEIRS' RIGHTS
The statute explicitly states that where a donee has an ab-
solute power of disposition and there is no gift in default of appoint-
ment, he shall have an absolute fee.61 This is in contrast to the
situation where there is a gift in default, in which case the donee is
deemed to have a fee with respect to creditors, purchasers, and in-
cumbrancers only.62 It would seem therefore that under the New
York statute where there is no gift in default and the donee can dis-
pose of the entire fee in his own lifetime for his own benefit, dower
or its statutory substitute should be allowed in the property as in
any other fee simple. This should also be true under the statute
when the donee has a life estate with a general, beneficial, testa-
mentary power, as long as there is no gift in default.
There are apparently only two cases in New York on the
question of the wife's right to dower in these instances. 63 In the
first, the husband had been left a life estate in realty "with the
right and power to dispose of the property by will." A codicil left
the property to the husband's heirs-at-law, if he did not dispose of
it by will. In holding that there was no dower right in this case,
the court expressly limited its decision to the case where there is
a gift in default of appointment. No case has been found where
there was no such gift.
With respect to the statutory forced share, Professor Powell
trustee. See Dudley v. People's Trust Co., 57 Misc. 230, 107 N.Y. Supp.
930 (Sup. Ct. 1907). The doctrine of Cutting v. Cutting has been much
criticized. 3 POWELL § 390; Whiteside & Edelstein, supra note 57, at
464-467.
61 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 151. See Ward v. Stanard, 82 App. Div.
386, 81 N.Y. Supp. 906 (2d Dept. 1903); Ryder v. Lott, 123 App. Div. 685,
108 N.Y. Supp. 46, aff'd, 199 N.Y. 543, 93 N.E. 1131 (1908).
62 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 150.
63 Barr v. Howell, 85 Misc. 330, 147 N.Y. Supp. 483 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Matter
of Davies, 124 Misc. 541, 209 N.Y. Supp. 296, aff'd, 215 App. Div. 750, 212
N.Y. Supp. 796, aff'd, 242 N.Y. 196, 151 N.E. 205 (1926).
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in his treatise cites three New York cases for the general principle
that there is no such right in the donee's power. He gives, as the
reason behind the rule, the dogma that the appointee takes from the
donor.64 This principle would seem to be inapposite here in view of
the explicit words of the statute in Section 151 creating a fee. In
all the cases cited, the limitations contained gifts in default of ap-
pointment. Therefore, it would appear that in a properly argued
case, where there is no such gift, the court should allow the wife's
interest.
No cases have been found deciding the rights of the donee's
heirs in an unexercised power falling under Sections 149 to 153 of
the Law, except those where the donee had an equitable life estate. 65
In such cases, as above noted,66 the courts have held that Sections
149 to 153 do not apply and they therefore never have to reach the
question of the heirs' rights. Seemingly, the analysis applicable to
the wife's rights would be here apposite.
V. ANALYSIS OF DONOR INTENT AND THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE DONEE'S INTEREST
Having examined these fundamentals, we will direct our
inquiry in the next succeeding sections to two underlying groups of
questions.
First, since a general power of appointment approaches a
property interest, it may be queried what purpose its use would
have that could not be served by giving the donee the fee? 67 If the
same purpose would be served by giving the interest outright,
should not the law disregard the agency fiction and treat the donee
of the power as the owner for all purposes? On the other hand, if
the general power does serve purposes other than merely to help
the donee avoid some of the burdens of ownership, and if a testator
or settlor could have legitimate reasons for giving the general power
64 3 POWELL § 391 n. 32, citing City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Green,
160 Misc. 370, 289 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1936); Matter of Rogers, 250 App. Div.
26, 293 N.Y. Supp. 626, and 168 Misc. 633, 6 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1938), and City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 163 Misc. 459, 297 N.Y. Supp. 88, rev'd
on other grounds, 278 N.Y. 134, 15 N.E.2d 553 (1938). See also Comment,
58 MICH. L. REV. 753, 758 n. 22 (1960), and cases there cited.
65 In re Fowler's Estate, 199 Misc. 995, 95 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Surr. Ct. 1949). The
court here does not seem to base its decision on the fact that the donee
had an equitable estate only. But cf. Matter of Hayman's Estate, 134
Misc. 803, 809, 237 N.Y. Supp. 215, 223, aff'd, 256 N.Y. 557, 177 N.E. 139
(1931). See also Cook v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 3 App. Div. 2d
634, 158 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1956).
66 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
67 See note 4 supra.
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but withholding the fee, should not the attitude of the law toward
its use perhaps be more liberal?
Second, with respect to each separate gift, it may be asked
what is the substance and nature of the conflicting claims seeking
to affirm or deny that the donee has an interest in property? 68
Should not the law weigh and balance these conflicting claims in
making the determination of whether the donee is the owner, re-
gardless of whether the donor's intent was to evade law-imposed
burdens of ownership or to effectuate a specific plan of disposition?
What principles and rules of law should follow from this process of
weighing and balancing the opposing interests?
In discussing these problems, we shall deal in more detail
with collateral powers,69 presently exercisable and testamentary, as
they present the most difficult questions for analysis. In addition,
powers in gross and appendant will be dealt with more cursorily.
The power to appoint less than a fee and the effect of the presence
or absence of a gift in default of appointment will also be con-
sidered.
A. GENERAL COLLATERAL POWER PRESENTLY EXERCISABLE
Suppose A, the owner in fee, devises Blackacre to whomever
C appoints by deed or will and until and in default of appointment
to B. What purpose could A have in leaving his property in this
manner that could not be effectuated by another method? The ap-
parent intent of A here is to give B the entire interest in the prop-
erty, but if C for any reason wants to divest B of his interest and
either give it to himself or to someone else, then A wants C to have
the power to do it. Such a situation might arise if B is A's wife and
C is A's son. A perhaps would want B to have the entire interest as
the first object of his bounty. But A might feel that if B remarries,
the interest should then go to C. In that case, of course, A's object
would be fulfilled if he left it to B in fee, but if B remarries then to
68 Professors Simes and Smith suggested that a power may not always be
so easily categorized when they say:
"Doubtless, the same group of legal relations may be regarded as a
property interest for one purpose and not for another. And it may be
said at the outset that, until we know the purpose for which the classifi-
cation 'interest in property' is to be applied, it is futile to attempt to de-
cide whether a given situation presents such an interest." SIMES &
SMITH § 942.
69 See note 8 supra for definitions of powers, collateral, in gross or appen-
dant.
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C.70 But suppose A does not want the gift automatically to shift.
Suppose he feels that an independent judgment as to the worth of
the man that B marries should be made at the time that she re-
marries. In that case, the only way that A could effect this result
would be to give someone he trusts the power to divest B of the
property. No means of disposition other than a general power
could effectuate A's intent. Even a special power would not serve
because C, the second natural object of A's bounty would then be
unable to appoint to himself.
What of the interest of C before he divests B of the property?
Can it be said that he has such an interest in Blackacre that his
creditors should be able to reach it, his wife should have dower in it,
and his heirs should inherit it if he dies intestate? Or should C's in-
terest be treated as an expectancy 7' which creditors, spouses and
heirs cannot touch? 72
It is obvious that the power is not just like an expectancy. An
expectancy is a prospective advantage to C over which C would
have no volitionary control. It represents something he may or
may not get according to what someone else chooses to do. On the
other hand, C has most effective control over whether he takes
Blackacre, if he has the general power. In that situation it is a
pure question of policy as to whether C's interest should be treated
as property or as something else; and the result may well depend
upon for what purpose we are evaluating C's interest.73 It does not
necessarily follow that because we would allow creditors to attach,
C's heirs should take by intestacy. The question must be narrowed
to whether we should in effect force C to exercise the power
in behalf of the different claimants. The law here must balance
many conflicting interests and intents: the intent of A, the original
70 This would be a fee simple subject to an executory limitation by way of
a shifting executory devise. RESTATEMENT, Property § 25, illustration
5 (1936).
71 "(1) One person is an 'expectant distributee' of another when such person
"(a) would be an heir or next of kin of that other, if that other
died forthwith; or
"(b) is reasonably likely to be an heir or next of kin of that
other; or
"(c) is named in the existing testamentary instrument of a
living person as a devisee or legatee thereunder; or
"(d) is reasonably likely to be named as a devisee or legatee in
the future testamentary instrument of another ... " RESTATE-
MENT, Property § 315 (1940).
72 Sackett v. Paine, 46 R.I. 439, 128 Atl. 209 (1925) ; RESTATEMENT, Prop-
erty § 317(1) (1940).
73 See note 68 supra.
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testator, that B have Blackacre unless and until C actually wants
it; the interest of B the fee owner; and the interest of C, the donee
of the power; all these must be balanced against the interest of the
outside claimants.
One other group of persons, however, must also be considered
as well. They are the heirs, creditors and spouse of B. The law must
decide whether as a matter of policy a piece of property can be
placed in the hands of B with an elastic string attached. When it
becomes inconvenient to B or C for B to have the property, because
of, let us say, B's attaching creditors, C pulls the string and miracul-
ously B no longer has an interest; C is now the fee owner. Or take
the reverse situation, with C's creditors seeking payment of their
debts. In such case, C can refuse to pull the string and under present
principles of law C's creditors can do nothing.7 4 Clearly, then, the
law should regard the interests of B and C as attachable or other-
wise subject to outsiders' claims without regard to whether or not
the power is actually exercised, unless it makes the deliberate
choice of subordinating the outsiders' claims to the intent of the
donor of the power and of the donee. It is the contention here that
these should not be so subordinated. Since C has the power to make
the property his own, those claiming adversely through him
(creditors and tax collectors) should be treated as though the
power has been exercised in their favor. Otherwise, the power of
appointment device is usable to defeat those claiming against one
who realistically and substantially viewed has a very valuable
asset.75 The strong public policy that a creditor be able to collect
from the assets of his debtor should not by the use of the power
fiction be so easily circumvented.
It may be asked whether under this analysis the creditors of
B and C can both attach. The answer to this must be, of course, that
B's creditors can take only the interest that B has, which, according
to traditional doctrine, would be much analogous to a fee subject to
74 See also note 35 supra and accompanying text.
75 This opinion of course is held by many writers in the field. The follow-
ing, found in the American Law of Property, is an apt example of what
has been said:
"This donee-is-a-mere-agent notion may be quite acceptable as a
description of the position of the donee of a special power, who cannot
himself benefit from its exercise, but it is difficult to avoid the conclu-
sion that it is unsatisfactory when applied to the donee of a general
power. He, like the 'owner' of a checking account, may secure the bene-
ficial use of the property merely by executing the proper document. No
policy which would permit creditors to reach the property in one situ-
ation but not in the other has been articulated." 5 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 23.17. See also SIMES & SMITH § 944.
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a shifting executory interest.76 This analysis is helpful in balancing
the interests of the parties. Under it the attaching creditors of B
would get the property subject to exercise of the power.77 To this it
might be argued that we are being inconsistent; that in the case of
an unexercised power we are treating B's interest as though the
power is unexercised for the purpose of assessing the rights of B's
creditors, but for the purpose of determining the rights of C's credi-
tors we are treating the power as exercised. This is no doubt true.
However, it is not complete logical and technical consistency that
we are seeking here, but a proper balancing of interests. It is sub-
mitted that the results thus obtained are desirable. B's creditors
never historically had the right to cut off the power.7 8 We are
merely adding now a new right, a right in C's creditors in conso-
nance with the substantial interests of the parties.
The more difficult problems are presented when the interests
of the spouse and heirs of the donee are considered. They are
more difficult because these parties have not given value for their
interests and their equities are therefore not as compelling. Can
it be said in our example above, if C dies intestate without having
exercised the power inter vivos, that C's heirs and next of kin
should take in preference to B and B's successors? It is submitted
that the heirs of C, in such case, have no equity that would call
for divesting B of her interest. There has been no policy of the
law against the disinherison of heirs, as such, since the Statute
of Wills in 1540. 79 And without this countervailing equity, is there
any reason not to effectuate the apparent intent of the donor and
donee of the power? The donor manifestly intended that B remain
the owner in fee unless C exercised the power. In most situations,
C, by not exercising the power in his own favor or for his heirs,
has evinced the intent that B remain the owner. It would appear,
therefore, that B and her successors should prevail over the heirs
of C.
76 SIMES & SMITH § 872.
77 In the case where the creditors of both simultaneously seek satisfaction
out of the property, C's creditors would levy on the property unfettered
by the rights of B's creditors.
78 Doe v. Jones, 10 B. & C. 459, 109 Eng. Rep. 521 (1830) ; Tunstall v. Trappes,
3 Sim. 286, 57 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1829); Brandies v. Cochrane, 112 U.S. 344
(1884).
79The following quotation shows the development of this:
"An ancient doctrine of Anglo-Saxon law which continued until
Glanvil's time in the latter half of the twelfth century limited the power
of the owner in fee to alien his land, especially if it was land which he
had inherited, by requiring him to retain a part of it for the benefit of
his presumptive heirs. The proportion which he could convey without
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The situation is different, however, with respect to the interest
of the spouse of the donee. Although since the Statute of Wills
it has always been possible to disinherit one's heirs, the same
has not been true of the spouse, who has had rights of dower
and curtesy and more recently the statutory forced share. 0 The
policy of the law has always been that the spouse has such rights
in spite of the contrary intent of the testator, and the attachment
of dower is generally favored.8' Society's continuing acceptance
of this policy is evidenced by the fact that the legislatures in a
number of jurisdictions are replacing or adding to the older
traditional rights of dower with the more substantial statutory
forced share. It is submitted, therefore, that the spouse of the
donee has such an equity in the donee's substantial interests and
the law should recognize the power of appointment as such as
interest, regardless of the fact that it is not a freehold interest or
property in the traditional sense. In a conflict between the spouses
of B and C after the death of both, C's spouse under this analysis
should prevail even though B died before C.8
2
the consent of his heirs is not known, and the actual details of this old
law are indefinite and obscure. It seems clear that the doctrine was de-
signed simply as a limitation on the owner's power to alien his estate
in fee....
"Toward the close of the twelfth century, this doctrine disappeared
silently and completely from the law. At the same time, the rule that
the heirs' portion could not be defeated by will came into being. From
that time until the enactment of the Statute of Wills (1540), freehold
estates in land could not be devised at law .... Maitland suggests that
the disappearance of the old rule, and the creation of the new rule as to
wills of land, was probably the result of compromise in order to make
land more readily alienable inter vivos: the presumptive heirs lost their
ancient and indefinite veto power over alienation, but were freed from
the possibility of disinheritance by will." 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 2.1.
Of course it could be strongly argued that there should be a policy
of the law against the disinherison of minor children. The law has never
gone quite this far, except to the extent that it protects pretermitted
children and in some states allows support out of the parent's estate.
See ATKINSON, WILLS 138-46 (1953).
80 For a detailed discussion of these rights see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 5.1-5.74.
81 "The rights of dower and curtesy are favored in the law." Shannon v.
Watt, 87 N.J. Eq. 142, 146, 99 Atl. 114, 115 (Ch. 1916), aff'd on opinion,
87 N.J. Eq. 611, 101 Atl. 251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917). See also Cushing v.
Blake, 30 N.J. Eq. 689, 697 (1879).
82 This result would conform to the rule that dower attaching to an estate
subject to the exercise of a power is defeated by the exercise of the
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Because of the fact that doctrines contrary to those suggested
here are so well established, it would of course take statutory
reform to effectuate these results.
B. THE GENERAL COLLATERAL TESTAMENTARY POWER
Suppose A devises Blackacre to whom C appoints by will but
until and in default of appointment to B and his heirs. In such
case, it would seem that C's power of disposition over the property
is an asset though clearly not as valuable an asset as the power
presently exercisable.8 3 C can leave the property to his estate or
creditors, but that is of no direct benefit to C in his own lifetime.
Nor under present principles can C effectively "sell" his power
to dispose of the property, for the traditional rule is that contracts
by the donee to exercise a testamentary power are unenforceable.8 4
If our hypothesis that creditors and spouses should share in the
donee's substantial assets is correct, then any rule excluding
them would clearly rest on the doctrine proscribing enforcement
of contracts to exercise a testamentary power. This rule in turn
is based solely upon the policy of the law that the donor's intent
(in this case, that the power not be exercised until the donee's
death) be effectuated. 5
Under the analysis suggested here, then, the interests of the
third' party claimants must be weighed against the policy of the
law that the donor's intent be effectuated. When the relationship
between the donee of the power and the person with whom he
has purported to contract to exercise the power is alone con-
sidered, there would appear to be no strong competing interest to
donor's intent. There is no possible reason why the donee himself
should have more than his donor chose to give him. It could be
argued that the party contracting with the donee should be pre-
ferred. However, it would seem that he should be just as charge-
able with knowledge of the extent of the donee's power as he
power. See note 18 supra. The rule should be on analysis equally applic-
able to a curtesy interest.
83 "In the case of the general testamentary power-one which the donee
can exercise in favor of anyone but cannot exercise except by will-the
approximation to ownership is present but considerably restricted by the
.limitation on the time of an effective appointment." 5 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 23.4.
84 Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938); U.S. Trust
Co. v. Montclair Trust Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 579, 33 A.2d 901 (Ch. 1943); RE-
STATEMENT, Property § 340 (1940).
85 Ibid.
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would be if the donee were a mere life. tenant attempting to sell
him a fee simple. It is when the rights of the spouse and creditors
are considered that an argument suggesting a competing interest
can be more effectively made. It is submitted, however, that these
two are really derivative interests and should rise to no greater
standing than the interest of the donee from which they are de-
rived.8 6 Since the donee could not himself enjoy the property
or its proceeds during his lifetime, it is not a substantial asset
inter vivos and should not be subject to his creditors during his
lifetime.
That is not to say, as the courts do, that these third parties
should not be able to reach the property subject to the power at
all. It is submitted that after the donee's death the third party
claimants should be able to reach the property to the extent that
we suggested they should be able to reach it, in the case of the
power presently exercisable.8 7 Specifically, the creditor of the
donee should be able to levy upon the appointive property after
the donee's death whether the power is exercised or not, since
the property could have been a substantial asset to the estate of
the donee had he chosen to exercise the power. The spouse of
the donee should have dower, curtesy or forced share rights on
the same ground, considering the policy of the law prohibiting
his or her disinherison. The heirs of the donee on the other hand
should be excluded on the ground that the donee evinced an
intent not to exercise the power in their behalf and there is no
policy of the law against their disinherison.
C. COLLATERAL GENERAL POWERS TO APPOINT THE REMAINDER
Suppose A devises property to B for life, remainder to whom-
ever C appoints by deed or will and until and in default of
appointment to D and his heirs. The apparent intent of A here
is to give B a life interest with remainder to D, but if C for some
86 For a most convincing argument that dower and curtesy should in all
cases end when the estate to which it attaches terminates by the terms
of its own limitation see RESTATEMENT, Property, appendix 1: Dower
and Curtesy as Derivitative Estates (1936).
As to the rights of creditors in defeasible interests see RESTATE-
MENT, Property § 52 (1936).
87 The editors of The American Law of Property seem to suggest this. "[The
donee of a general testamentary power] can, however, make any appoint-
ment he pleases effective at his death, including an appointment to his
own estate, and with respect to incidents attaching after his death, he
should be treated as effectively the owner of the appointed property."
5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.4. (Emphasis added.)
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reason needs the property or wants to divest D of it, he may do
so. Such a situation might arise where B is the wife and C and D
are the two children of A. If A feels that D has the greater need
for the entire interest in the property but does not trust D's
discretion in dealing with it, he may want to give C, a child whose
discretion he does trust, the power to divest D of his interest.
Such an intent could not be effectuated with the trust device
(C as trustee for D) because A wants D initially to have the entire
interest and to continue to have control unless he is indiscreet in
handling it. A discretionary device, the power of appointment,
would have to be used.
It is apparent that the interest of C, the donee here, is some-
what different on analysis from the case where the donee has a
power presently exercisable to appoint the fee to himself. C no
longer has absolute control of the property; there is no way that
he can divest B of her life interest. The parties claiming through
C should no more be able to cut off B's life estate than they should
if C's interest were a vested remainder following a life estate.
However, third party claims should be allowed with respect to
the remainder interest itself under the approach we suggested
for the collateral power to appoint the fee."" Thus, creditors should
be allowed to attach the donee's remainder interest whether the
power is exercised or not and the spouse's claims should be allowed
on the same basis. The heirs of the donee would be excluded.
A similar solution is suggested for the testamentary power.
Suppose A devises Blackacre to B for life, remainder to whom C
appoints by will, and until and in default of appointment to D
and his heirs. In such case the creditors of C should be able to
levy upon the remainder after C's death whether the power was
exercised or not, and the spouse should get his or her rights after the
death of B and C. The heirs of the donee would be excluded.
D. THE GENERAL POWER IN GROSS
The general power in gross presents in even bolder relief the
proprietary aspect of the power. Thus, suppose A devises Blackacre
to B for life, remainder as B by deed or will appoints, and in default
of appointment to C. B in this case has a present right to possession
together with a presently exercisable power to dispose of the
remainder. Such an interest when realistically analyzed is prac-
88 This would be on the same basis as creditors can now reach a true vested
remainder. See SIMES & SMITH § 1923 and RESTATEMENT, Property
§166 (1936).
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tically and substantially the equivalent of complete ownership.8 9
And indeed, it is difficult to find a legitimate reason why A would
not give the donee a fee simple in the first place. What is the
purpose in giving B a life interest and a power to make the fee
his own any time he wants to if it is not to help B evade some
of the burdens of ownership? Here there is no element of the
donor wanting to give the donee a discretion to divest the first
taker of his interest, for the first taker is also the donee. It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that there is even more compelling reason to
brush aside the technicalities and allow the creditors and spouse
of the donee to reach the entire interest, the former at any time
and the latter after the donee's death.
The heirs of the donee in this type of case also have a stronger
argument in their favor. If, as before stated, the donee realistically
has a fee, why should his heirs not take by intestacy if he does not
exercise the power? It is suggested that the answer to this also
must be found by weighing the conflicting interests and intents.
It would seem that in the case posited, the intent of the donor
that the property go elsewhere in default of appointment should
control, since the heirs have no standing via a recognized policy of
the law. To this it might be replied that possible grantor intent
that the heirs not take is immaterial where the grantee is given
a fee simple absolute. In rejoinder, however, it should be said
that the rights of the heirs here are more analogous to the case
where the intestate has a fee simple subject to a shifting executory
interest. The limitation "to X but if X dies without issue him
surviving then to Y" would be an example. X's heirs would not
take if X died intestate without issue surviving; and they would
not take because of the expressed intent of the grantor that the
gift shift on a certain event. The same would be true in the case
of the power under discussion. The donor has expressed the intent
that the gift shift upon the happening of a certain event, viz.,
the donee dying without having exercised the power. The heirs,
then, should not take.
The testamentary power in gross involves other problems. If
89 Statements of this purport are found even where the donee does not
have a life estate.
"The donee of a general power of appointment, where the power is
presently exercisable, is effectively the beneficial owner of the property
subject to the power." 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.4.
"The general power presently exercisable is the practical equivalent
of ownership, since it gives to the donee the power to acquire ownership
at any time by appointing to himself." RESTATEMENT, Property, c. 25,
introductory note at 1813 (1940).
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A leaves Blackacre to B for life, remainder as B by will appoints,
little argument could be made against A's having legitimate dis-
positive intent. Such a case would exist if A and B were husband
and wife, A had no other object of bounty, and A feared B would
completely dissipate the funds and be left without means of
support. A, under these circumstances, would give B a life estate
(usually in trust) with a general power to appoint the remainder.9 0
What of B's creditors and spouse here? It would seem that
the rules suggested with respect to the collateral testamentary
power should be applicable with one exception. Since the creditor
seeking satisfaction out of the donee's assets also has a right to
levy upon the life estate, there is no reason to postpone until the
donee's death the levy upon the remainder subject to the power.9 1
E. THE PowER APPENDANT
As noted above,92 the power appendant to the fee was widely
used in early English history as a means of evading certain re-
strictive rules of law. The patent anomaly of a person having a
fee simple or life estate and a power of appointment over the same
interest has been thoroughly discussed and attacked by several
important authorities,93 as well as by at least one court.9 4 The
Restatement of Property has taken the position that there is no
such type of interest in this country.95 One authority has taken a
contrary position. 6 No matter which view is taken, however, it is
perfectly clear that the power device should not be permitted to
90Of course where the donor has secondary objects of bounty, use of the
special power would be appropriate.
91 It should be noted that New York has equated a life estate and testa-
mentary power in gross to a fee, to the same extent it has a power
presently exercisable. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 152, supra note 56.
The results suggested here are somewhat the same.
92 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
93SIMES & SMITH § 914; 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.13;
Simes, Devolution of Title to Appointed Property, 22 ILL. L. REV. 480,
497 (1928).
94 Browning v. Bluegrass Hardware Co., 153 Va. 20, 149 S.E. 497 (1929).
95 "Powers Appendant Excluded.
"(1) To whatever extent an instrument purports to create a power
to divest a beneficial interest transferred by such instrument to the pur-
ported donee, or at that time owned by him, it is ineffective.
"(2) When the donee of a power of appointment acquires a beneficial
interest which was theretofore subject to being divested by an appoint-
ment, the power to divest such interest is thereby extinguished." RE-
STATEMENT, Property § 325 (1940).
98 3 POWELL § 388.
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be used to defeat the spouse, creditors, or even the heirs of the fee
owner-donee. It is believed that no modern authority would take
a contrary position.
F. EFFECT OF DONOR'S FAILURE TO MAKE A GIFT
IN DEFAULT OF APPOINTMENT
As noted before, the New York statute enacts that the donee
of an absolute power of disposition (as defined in the statute) has
a fee as to all the world where there is no gift in default of ap-
pointment.97 On the other hand, the donee has a fee as to creditors,
purchasers, and incumbrancers only, where there is such a gift.98
It is doubtful whether this approach is sound upon analysis. When
we are weighing the conflicting intents and interests, the only
interest to which the presence or absence of a gift in default has
relevance is the donor's. And whether the donor intended the gift
to go to a third party in default of appointment or back to himself
is immaterial. The fact is that in either case his presumed intent
would be that the heirs of the donee not take in default of ap-
pointment; otherwise, he would have provided for them by an
express gift.99 It would appear, therefore, that the lack of a gift
in default should be deemed irrelevant in determining the rights
of the parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The general power of appointment does serve a most legitimate
function in adding flexibility to our conveyancing system. The
argument that the same purposes can be served by other devices
does not really stand up under close scrutiny. No other device can
be used to postpone the exercise of discretion as to the identity
of the taker and the time that he takes. There is, therefore, no
really convincing reason why the use of a general power should
be proscribed or abolished. The law, on the other hand, should
not allow the power device to be used automatically to defeat
third-party claims by blind application of the dogma that a power
is not property. Whether a general power is to be properly viewed
as a property interest or as an authority depends upon the facts
case by case and for what purpose the power is being evaluated.
97 See note 61 supra.
98 See note 62 supra.
99 But see Commentary by Dean Everett Fraser. under MINN. STAT. ANN.
(1945) § 502.78 which says that this would not be true in the case of home-
made wills.
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No all-inclusive rule that a general power is or is not property
is desirable or helpful in solving problems. The goal should be
the achievement of substantial justice between the parties without
regard to ancient legal fictions.
The New York statutory system had promise of eliminating
some of the abuses of powers until the Cutting case,100 in effect,
destroyed the statute. The statutory rules in New York, however,
never went far enough. Under them, it would seem the only time
a wife could have dower or forced share rights to the donee's
appointive property is where the donee has an absolute power of
disposition and there is no gift in default of appointment. Spouse's
and creditors' rights should be allowed in all appointive property
subject to a general power, testamentary or presently exercisable,
and whether the power has been exercised or not. These rights
should be subject to certain limitations where the power is testa-
mentary only. 10 1
An examination of all the American cases on powers decided
in the past fifteen years has revealed that there is no discernible
trend toward the results here suggested. State statutory reform102
is necessary and advisable in the field of powers of appointment
in order to make the rules concerning them conform more with
salutary policies of the law which create burdens upon ownership.
100 See note 60 supra.
101 That is, creditors should be allowed to attach only after the death of
the donee.
102 A reform statute was enacted in Minnesota under the guidance of Dean
Fraser. Under the statute the creditors of the donee of a general power
presently exercisable may reach the appointive property whether the
power is exercised or not. However, the creditors of the donee of the
general testamentary power may not come in unless the power is actu-
ally exercised. MINN. STAT. ANN. (1945) § 502.70.
